This discussion considers four ethical positions (liberal^individualist; Habermasian; communitarian; postmodernösee figure 1). The argument moves across the figure and in doing so looks at the relationship between rationality, ethics, and space. As we move across the figure the ethical approaches become increasingly antirationalist. The ethical Rationality, ethics, and space: on situated universalism and the self-interested acknowledgement of`difference'
Abstract. The author explores the relationship between rationality, ethics, and space. He argues that the contemporary ethical project involves a derationalisation of ethics through a recorporealisation of space. There is a move away from the abstract space of liberal^individualist notions of justice to more enclosed and local spaces of communitarian loyalties and intersubjective communication. Postmodern interventions into the ethical realm lead us to a corporealised, intimate space that recognises difference and is heavy with phenomenological presence. The author argues that the conception of agency which explains adherence to community norms and the acknowledgement of difference is strategically rational self-interest. Situated practices and understandings of the other rely on rational assumptions. The time^space conditions of late modernity bring unlike others into more regular contact and open up the possibilities for more universalist forms of strong (ethical) social coordination based on expanded strategic rationality. I^thou' corporeal intimate space programmes themselves move from the impartial to the partial. The conception of space also becomes increasingly partial: socially constituted and corporeal. I argue that, in order to understand the partiality of ethics situated in social/body space, we must retain the idea of rationality. At its broadest this is the interaction of consistent purposes. These purposes can be constituted over and congeal over a range of social/technological, temporal, and spatial scales involving, for instance, organisations and networks of humans and technology (an issue discussed later in this paper). More conventionally understood rational action is associated with consistent purposes that congeal in individuals who act consistently in their best interests. Being strategic means having to take account of the actions of other people with whom one interacts because the choices others make might affect one's fate and knowing this might in turn affect one's strategy choice. This dialogic idea of interdependent action makes only certain forms of social coordination possible and the strongest of these we might call ethical norms (1) . I argue that this conception of rationality offers an explanation (in a way that Habermasian, communitarian, and postmodern theories do not) as to why ethical norms are partial and situated. It is through the conjunction of situated rationality and its relationship to network space of late modernity that the possibility of a universalist ethical programme might emerge.
As Sayer and Storper have argued recently:`W e need to question whether goals are feasible, that is not only in terms of whether we can get from A to B but whether B would be feasible anyway... . If we are to think normatively about good and bad forms of social order we also have to think positively (that is, descriptively, explanatorily) about what forms of social order actually exist and, as far as we can see, could feasibly exist at some other time' ' (1997, page 7) . I argue that assuming that moral agents are strategically rational begins to encompass some of the concerns of more situated, partial conceptions of ethics that come from communitarian and postmodernist writing (figure 1). Strategic rationality is situated rationality. This approach indicates that we can have an understanding of situated ethics (including`our' own) without losing the universalist impulses that come from an emerging impartiality that derives from a cosmopolitan experience of situated otherness.
The cosmopolitan experience is more consistent with the prevailing conditions of late modernity. These conditions include time^space compression/distanciation (Giddens, 1990; Harvey, 1989) . As a result of increased mobility and communications technology copresent relations are stretched out in time and space and distant relations are collapsed in to make the nature of consequential interaction a mixture of traditional, copresent, or proximate relations and localised global interactions. This means that dialogic relations are less predictable and sometimes even difficult to identify at all. We might be interacting with geographically remote`others' in the form of people, computer programs, media images. These forces combine with certain consequences of globalisation to make the late modern period one in which shared histories are a product of a much wider range of influences than before. The proximate relations of family and local community combine with spaceless but mediatised ones (`shared'global events on TV for example). The growth of global events and influences challenges taken-for-granted authority structures, a trend of detraditionalisation (Heelas et al, 1996) . This in turn gives rise to a tendency for the refashioning of identity (for example, Giddens, 1992) . There are tensions between taken-for-granted roles and new ways of seeing the self, and others. A heightened (1) Norms as strong forms of social coordination represent a view of ethics as egoistic prudence in the face of the other. It is a social and secular understanding of ethics. The profound questions of ethical systems based on religious faith are not considered here, except insofar as there might be social norms to guide the coordination of actions between those of different faiths, or indeed between secular and religious communities. reflexivity is characteristic of these conditions, given all the more impetus by the individuation of risk in late modern society (Beck et al, 1994) and the greater significance of choice in everyday life. All these conditions of late modernity öthe wider range of interactions, mediatised and local memories, greater reflexivity, and significance of choiceöenhance the role of strategic choice and rationality in social and ethical relations.
Rationality as impartiality: the ethical`original position'
The original formulation of rationality in neoclassical economics can be defined as individuals acting consistently in their best interests within their constraints'. This is Homo economicus. The selfish concerns of atomised individuals seeking to maximise their utility may seem a long way from the broader ethical concerns of a society or group as a whole. Nevertheless, it is the model we are most used to and the one that contributes to the left-hand column of the ethical map (figure 1). It is the basis for several versions of social contract theory. In the Hobbesian world, for example, the pursuit of selfish interests places individuals in conflict in a war of all against all (Hobbes, 1986 ). Hobbes's solution, the Leviathan, is for individuals to give up certain of their freedoms in a social contract with the state to facilitate the smooth running of society, or indeed for society to be possible at all.
The most influential formal statement of a liberal^individualist contractarian conception of justice is Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1972) . This formulation provides an ex ante justification for self-interested individuals to choose a just (as in fair) society. A Theory of Justice starts from the premise of rational, self-interested individuals choosing their preferred type of society. Their set of choices is a range of societies with different social distributions as a result of ability, wealth, and well-being. These range from a highly divided society, where the rich do far better and the poor far worse than in any other type of society, through to a more equitable distribution where the poor do best (relative to other societies). Rational agents must choose their preferred type of society from behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing their identities or abilities and therefore ignorant of the social position in which they will find themselves in that chosen society. Rawls argues that self-interested rational individuals will choose the society in which the poor do best (given that they might end up being poor). Their choice will be risk averse. They will think about the worst-case scenario in each society and choose the society in which the worst-case scenario is least worst (the maximum solution). Equally they will choose a society where social differences are permitted, but only if the poor do better out of that egalitarian situation than in a totally equal society. Thus from an original position of rational self-interested individuals we arrive at an egalitarian society. This insight was Rawls's basis for a rejuvenated conception of justice from a universalist, impartial, liberal^individualist perspective and one that rested on the notion of a fully conscious rational individual öthe cogito, acting in self-interest, the`I' (column 1, figure 1).
The assumptions of the original position are that we choose rationally but that the parameters are set (the distribution of positions in the different societies). Our choices as individuals are made in isolation against these parameters. The parameters are nonintentional (like the market or nature) and so the choices and purposes of others do not come into the choices of the rational agent, choosing behind the veil of ignorance. Rawls's moral agent is parametrically rational.
I suggest that this position connects to a conception of abstract space in which such a rational agent operates. Versions of liberalism are bound up with the development of the nation-state and the basis on which individuals are constituted as citizens who have entitlements to impartial rights. It is also evident in broader conceptions of universal human rights that are not bound by the particularities of culture, geography, and history. Ideas of`impartiality' also relate to the legal instruments used to ensure easy exchange in capitalist markets. It is a way of emptying the exchange of all social freight other than the economic transaction. It is an abstract space of exchange emptied of prior social relations. There are debates within liberalism about the degree to which particularity, culture, and community should be included (for example, Kymlicka, 1995) . Here I characterise the liberal agenda as the attempt to conceive of the ethical principles to deal with proximate and`remote' others in the same way and, as far as possible, to treat space abstractly, emptied of its social constitution.
Rawls's rational agents are not ethical empty vessels in the original position. They act in rational self-interest but have higher order interests in their conception of the good and their conception of justice. Rawls's veil of ignorance is used to show the commonly shared presumptions about the nature of the impartiality that should characterise a theory of justice (Sugden, 1993) .
In contrast, Gauthier (1986) attempts to construct a theory of morality based only on the presumption of rationality, without any moral priors. His version of rationality is not a game against a`given' such as nature or society (or hypothesised societies öa© la Rawls) which would be parametric, but involves the choices of others in its calculus (that is, it is strategically rational). Like other contractarians Gauthier argues that people bargain in order to capitalise on the benefits of social cooperation (the cooperative surplus as he calls it). He argues that bargaining over the distribution of the cooperative surplus has a unique solution and as a consequence the universality and impartiality of morals based on rationality are maintained. Sugden (1993) disagrees, arguing that the outcome of strategically rational interaction often results in multiple equilibria, all of which are defensible (in game-theoretic terms all are Nash equilibria) and for which, in certain classes of games, the rationalistic assumptions do not lead to a unique solution. These multiple equilibria equate to a range of possible moral norms of distribution of the cooperative surplus. According to Sugden an impartial code is impossible on the basis of assumptions of strategic rationality.
We might conclude from these arguments that any connection between rationality, ethics, and space is broken and that the relationship between ethics and space will be established on other grounds. I argue in this paper that multiple outcomes are precisely why rationality has to be considered in other ethical systems (communitarian and postmodern). This is not a conventional understanding, however. Indeed, one ethical approach sees rationality in such serious need of repair that it requires a complete reformulation before it can offer anything substantive to an ethical programme. It is to this rational reconstruction that we now turn.
Rationality in the intersubjective realm: Habermas and discourse ethics Habermas attempts to move towards more intersubjective and partial ethical concerns (column 2, figure 1) whilst still holding on to a notion of rationality (Habermas, 1984; 1987) . He seeks to rid rationality of its instrumentalism (the self-interested meansê nds rationality that we see in the Rawlsian model) and make rationality shared and intersubjective. This is achieved through a conception of language that separates perlocutionary from locutionary and illocutionary success. Perlocutionary success means getting someone to do something by saying something. In a world dominated by the rational abstract space of capitalism and the rationalisation of bureaucracy (Weber, 1968) getting someone to do something usually means getting them to do something that serves as a means to self-interested ends. Thus perlocution in a world dominated by the oppressions of`the system', preys on communication and distorts it to serve selfish possessive individualism. For Habermas, if the perlocutionary effects of language could be separated from the exchange of communication we would be left with illocutionary and locutionary communication based on sincerity in the dramaturgical realm, truth in the objective realm, and rightness in the social realm. The exchange of such situated but nonmanipulative information may open up a discursive realm of`undistorted communication' where our ethical agreements would be achieved in the process of these negotiations and mutual exploration. A procedural discourse ethics would emerge from the process of exchange of sincere, truthful, and normatively right statements.
An ethical realm might thus be established procedurally on the basis of communicative rationality (see column 2, figure 1). If we are to communicate our meanings systems truthfully, sincerely, and with norm-guided rightness then we may come to understand each other's situatedness and proceed to discuss the rational bases of each other's arguments based on`good reasons or grounds' for those statements. Good reasons or grounds for arguments that are subjected to reflexive scrutiny is Habermas's version of substantive rationality. In this sense`good reasons or grounds' depend on the clear expression of the situatedness that individuals' views of the objective world, their social/cultural situations and inner psychological worlds. Such statements would be open to rational refutation or disputation. This debate calls on the participants' reflexive powers. The truthfulness and sincerity and rightness of statements call upon validity claims. By arguing in a certain way, say in terms of the rightness of my social norms, I am basically saying that there are validity criteria that I can call upon to substantiate my claim in the face of your criticism. The acceptance of the warranty (whatever its content-rightness) of this claim is to make both parties open to rational discussion out of which a common definition of the situation might emerge. This reflexive element of the ethical programme Habermas claims is missing in Rawls. When validity claims are raised there is moral argumentation. I seek to redeem the validity claim rather than manipulating or coercing you into suiting my (instrumental) purposes.
From this situated context of honestly expressed partiality Habermas moves to a conception of impartiality through a principle of universalisation. For Habermas a norm is universal if all affected can accept the consequences that its general observance is anticipated to have for the satisfaction of each individual's interests (and that these consequences are better than the alternatives) (Habermas, 1990) . As Moon (1995) argues, this assumes that those who can enter into argumentation are capable of coming to the same judgments on the acceptability of norms of action and that`t his is true only if those affected by an action or norm have values, emotions, affections, and preferences that are more or less compatible'' (page 150). Only then could they``reach consensus on generalisable maxims'' (Habermas, 1990 , page 120; cited in Moon, 1995, page 150) . Based on this underlying view of the spectrum of human nature Habermas is able to move from partiality to impartiality, moralp ractical discourse breaks from the concrete ethical life. This debate would start within individual language/cultural community and reach out to others in an ever-widening public realm' in which the debate takes place.
Habermas's notion of the public realm leaves us with an intersubjectively enclosed space of interaction. I would argue that the base conditions for establishing undistorted communication demand (at least in the early stages) a high degree of physical proximity and a discursive space that is intersubjectively constructed. This is expressed through Habermas's layers of world relations that he imputes to actors. The first realm is the one world of objective relations. This is the world of goal-oriented behaviour facilitated (for Habermas) by instrumental and strategic rationality. In some senses this is agreement about the world as it is and our goals within it. Here we are acting like Homo economicus and space is that of`the system': abstract and unlimited. The second world relation is that of the social world. Here normatively regulated action prevails involving`m embers of a group who orientate their action to common values'' (Habermas, 1984, page 85) . These are communal/cultural norms, which are considered to be`right'. The third realm is that of sincerity which is expressed dramaturgically. This involves the sorts of micropersonal spaces that were the subject of Goffman's (1971) work. The intersection of abstract space, communal space, and interpersonal space constitutes the public realm where communicative rationality can flourish. To begin with this is a local space, one of familiarity with the other. From these confidence-building measures the public realm can expand and involve ever-greater participation of critical and reflexive individuals and institutions whose identities are not wholly bound by norms and who can work on cultural traditions in creative, contemporary ways (see Benhabib, 1992, chapter 3) . This is a discursive public space that fosters discursive will formation. The reflexive element of discussion (defence of validity claims) produces for Habermas a tendency towards consensus. People prioritise a desire to come to an agreement on the definition of the situation. Habermas's ethics are procedural (agreed upon in the course of discussion). They also combine elements of abstractness and intersubjectivity. The discussion proceeds intersubjectively but the basis for establishing the better argument relies both on the grounds of the argument in the objective, social, and dramaturgical worlds but also includes a notion of good reasons based on some sort of logical criteria. There is a sense in which the progress of communicatively rational communication and a clash of partialities will lead to greater impartiality as an ethical outcome. Part of Habermas's mission after all is to rescue certain elements of the Enlightenment project, one central part of which I take to be an enlightened ethical realm. According to Habermas the way to get there is to clear away the imperatives of the abstract logic of the system and allow the intersubjective communication of the lifeworld to flourish.
The way in which the public realm is extended raises vital questions about the nature of the channels of communication in late modernity. Harvey (1996) argues that Habermas ignores the realities of differentiated political space and that he has`n o conception of how spatio-temporalities and`places' are produced and how that process is integral to the process of communicative action and of valuation'' (page 234). As well as the unpredictability of encounter in the network space of late modernity (Bridge, 1997a) a simple increase in the numbers of people interacting poses problems for questions of equal participation and representation of situated interests. Spatial scale is a problem for Habermas.
Problems in conceptualising the character of the public realm raise some of the difficulties of Habermasian ethics. There are strong utopian elements to his demand for the separation of perlocutionary speech-acts from locutionary/illocutionary ones. The nature of the system, which presses instrumental rationality into the lifeworld, also makes the constitution of a public realm free from these influences difficult to imagine. We cannot separate off the lifeworld from the system in this way. Habermas has too strong a notion of the significance of language in binding the community together intersubjectively. Indeed it has been argued elsewhere that Habermas's reformulation of rationality is unnecessary: that many of the communicative concerns that he has are within the compass of a form of strategic rationality that is very much part of`the system' and its time^space coordinates (Bridge and Huxley, 1997) .
The enclosed space of communitarian ethics An alternative route is to avoid the attempt to extend the ethical space in moving from partiality to impartiality and concentrate instead on the internal workings of the ethical community itself and on the reproduction of its ethical norms. Thus the work of communitarians has become increasingly influential over the last twenty years. This is a reaction to the disembeddedness of the moral agent of liberalism and an argument that moral judgments are grounded in community norms (MacIntyre, 1981; Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 1989; 1992a; 1992b; Walzer, 1983) .
Communitarianism takes a view of ethics as situated in the community context (see column 3, figure 1). Ethical norms are foundational in that they are handed down through linguistic and cultural practices to succeeding generations for which they are fundamental in terms of social identity. With the increasing influence of Wittgenstein's (1953) notions of`forms of life' these communal grounded ethics are seen as incommensurable and therefore irreconcilable between cultures öhence their foundational and in some cases, fundamentalist nature. Being grounded in the community they are explicitly partial to that community. They are part of a collective consciousness of the`we'. In this situation ethics are not so much a question of moral dilemmas and choices facing the autonomous agent; instead, the ethical project relies on the loyalty and communal orientation of its members.
Communitarianism powerfully implies a community and local space. Indeed localness and proximity are important components of the partiality of this ethical approach. As Harvey (1996) argues, where communitarians draw the boundary really matters. Ethical commitments are local loyalties to kin and community and as such the moral realm of communitarianism is the local space of commitment as members of a community. Those to whom we have responsibility are familiar faces, the people we know in our neighbourhood. In contrast to the abstract space of the liberal impartial moral realm this is a socialised space of local commitment involving known others. Space here is socially constituted and bounded by the moral horizons of the community.
The social constitution of local space becomes very clear when we move from the philosophical discussion to the more practical implementation of communitarian aspirations (for example, Etzioni, 1993) . Much of the policy discussion is aimed at supporting strong families (for which read nuclear) to build strong communities. The scale of intervention is decidedly local in flavour, based on the neighbourhood primary school and other local amenities. Rights are gained on the basis of our discharging our responsibilities as community members. Translated into contemporary British politics, for example, this means making sure children in our neighbourhood do not abscond from school.
Though they are never explicit about it, communitarians have a notion of community that is small-scale, a dense network of connections and commitments through which community norms can be enforced. Indeed it is the re-establishment of that dense moral fabric that communitarians seek (strong families in supportive communities) to repair the alienation and moral dissolution of mass modern society. Communitarianism seeks moral rejuvenation through the establishment of multiple ties of commitment in a recognisable space. The communitarian effort is involved in the (re)making of place.
Within communitarianism intracommunity loyalties are forged at the expense of interaction with other communities. There is an assumption of the fundamental incommensurability of values between different culture communities. As Young (1990a; 1990b) argues, this notion of community is a totalising concept in that it has no ontological exterior beyond the unity of the general will and no historical exterior (in that there is no further stage to travel). It is a social space that dissolves difference within the community limits and ignores difference beyond them.
Postmodern ethics of the space for difference By contrast the recognition of difference is a touchstone of postmodern approaches to ethical questions. Postmodern ethics covers a wide range of ethical positions, including going beyond ethics to aesthetics (see Bauman, 1993) . One group of discussions within postmodern ethics is concerned to recognise`difference' in a nonoppressive way. This first means establishing the singularity and subjectivity of difference. I argue that this is achieved by taking a highly corporealised and situated view of space. It is also a dialogical space shed of any cognitive or rationalist baggage (column 4, figure 1) .
The notion of difference in postmodern ethics can be understood via Levinas's (1969) conception of`I'. The`I' for Levinas is a singularity.``It is a subjectivity that can suffer; a subjectivity that can be called by his or her name. It is a subjectivity... who is Abraham in face of God's call'' (Lash, 1996, page 92) . The call of the other is thus a unique encounter which takes place with singular human others in the intimate space. Levinas builds an ethical event from the uniqueness of the encounter with the face of the other. This is in direct contrast to the abstract ego of contractual individualism in which universal ethical principles are applied to particular situations. It is the`I' facing infinity rather than the`I' of totality.
The constitution of space here is that of the intimate, unique, intercorporeal encounter. Thus Levinas identifies`proximity'as a key constitutive factor of the encounter with the other. Here proximity means all the surplus or all the goodness of an original sociality (Gardiner, 1996) . Gardiner identifies this spatial constitution through the work of Martin Buber in the I^thou relation (column 4, figure 1) defined as``the subjective, highly personalistic relation between two flesh-and-blood human beings located firmly in actual time and space'' (Gardiner, 1996, page 125) . Adapting the work of Bakhtin, Gardiner argues that we are forced to transform the givenness of the world into meaningfulness by making a space for the other out of the metaphysical void or featureless homogeneity of time and space (abstract space). This meaningful space is one of living and in principle nonmerging participants of the event.
This space of encounter also requires that we divest ourselves of our rationalcognitive assumptions about the given world of abstraction. We should abandon our purely cognitive or intentional relation to the other. According to Gardiner (1996, page 132) :`R esponsibility to the Other pre-exists self-consciousness; it by-passes rational, calculative thought. I do not grasp the other so as to dominate, but I respond to the face's epiphany as if to a summons that cannot be ignored.'' The epiphany of the face is Levinas's construction. For Levinas postmodern ethics means the moral agent's unconditional responsibility in the face of the other. Levinas's moral journey involves a move from proximity to infinity. Proximity rests on the goodness of original forms of sociality. His infinity is the epiphany that results from the immediate confrontation with the face of the other that produces a limitless disposition of care and tenderness. The reason for this transformative aspect of encounter is that our selves are not atomised and unified but relational and pluralistic. The self is generated out of the self^other alterity (I^thou), so that our sense of self comes from others and vice versa. Consciousness is in essence multiple and our own selfhood is a`gift' from the other. Moral goodness comes from alterity rather than cogito (column 4, figure 1). Indeed cognitive^discursive thought could be seen as unethical. It brings in the instrumentalism of the system to colonise the concrete lifeworld.
What are the consequences of the dialogical moment of encounter? Here the postmodern ethical programme diverges. For Levinas the look of suffering on the face of the other gives us an unconditional responsibility towards the other. But that responsibility need not result in action. Lash argues that at the crucial moment Levinas's programme turns to abstraction in that he assumes the world is narrowly egotistical and utilitarian and so displaces everything of valueöGod, infinity, freedom, the ethicalöto a higher and infinite realm (Lash, 1996 , page 102). The ethical event is displaced to this higher realm through an attitude of patience and suffering in this world.
An attitude of patience reflects a wider nonaction orientation of postmodern ethics. Indeed, a good deal of the postmodern ethical programme is concerned to remove the action orientation of traditional Western ethics. It develops from a critique of traditional moral philosophy and its concentration on ethical dilemmas as ones over the correct way to act. This action orientation overly narrows the field of ethical understanding. As Honneth argues:`W hat brought this ethical countermovement to fruition was the insight that fixation on human action is necessarily accompanied by a categorical narrowing of the field of perception: under the pressure to act morally in an appropriate and`responsible' manner, neither the other person, nor the world in toto can be perceived in their inner diversity. To that extent the tendency to repress the particularity of the other is latently tied to the action fixation of modern moral theory'' (Honneth, 1995, page 299). The movement away from an action orientation in moral philosophy is what Heidegger (1966) called gelassenheit (letting be). Habermas is calling for something similar when he argues for the linguistic division of perlocutionary from locutionary/ illocutionary speech acts. Perlocutionary speech is based on means^ends rationality, which Habermas thinks distorts communication for selfish ends and therefore corrupts the discursive conditions that might enable the procedural ethic to proceed. Remove the pressure of teleological (means^ends) action, says Habermas, and we might at least begin to be able to have the sort of conversation that would enable us to progress ethically.
Another example of this`letting be' to allow space for the other is found in Young's work. Young (1990a; 1990b) argues against the totalising attitudes of both liberal individualism and communitarianism. She does this with a postmodern emphasis on the importance of difference. This difference should not be subsumed by the communal will of the communitarian ethic nor be ignored by the isolated, independent, and alienated nature of the self-contained moral actor of liberal individualism. There is another moral pathway according to Young. This is one that recognises and acknowledges difference and the particularity of each person. Difference and particularity cannot be abstracted from (as in the abstract individual of liberalism) nor dominated by difference dissolving communal will. Young argues that the best potential examples of the types of human relationships that exhibit these qualities are to be found in cities. She gives various conditions which would help produce``the unoppressive city'' in which relationships would be based on the``acknowledgement of unassimilated otherness'' (Young, 1990b) . This acknowledgement I see as a form of passive cosmopolitanism; tolerance and understanding born out of the experience of other ways of life and value systems that can be most easily obtained in the socially and culturally heterogeneous city.
Strategic rationality and ethics
Whether it is thought of as an idealised urban relationship, intersubjective understanding, community loyalty, or postmodern encounter, there has been a turn in ethics from the impartial to the partial and from the universal to the particular. Alongside this has been the assumption that, as we move across the columns of figure 1, we must abandon the notion of rationality. In the remainder of this paper I argue, contrary to these assumptions, that an understanding of strategic rationality takes us to the heart of the concerns of communitarians and postmodernists. In addition it provides an explanation as to why people might be loyal to their community or acknowledge difference in a way that Habermasian, communitarian, and postmodern philosophies do not. Furthermore, the exigencies of the prevailing conditions of time^space in late modernity make a strategically rational explanation of interactions and ethical norms the most plausible one.
Where strategic rationality is associated with agents as individuals it is defined as individuals acting rationally (consistently in their self interest) but having to take account of the actions of others with whom they interact'. This is distinct from the parametric version where the intentions of others are taken as given. The conception of rationality that supports the Rawlsian theory of justice is parametric, based on atomised, self-interested, instrumental ego playing a nonintentional environment (a given set of possibilities for the arrangement of societies). Parametric rationality is predominantly that of Homo economicus that treats`the other' as external and generalised. The Rawlsian moral agent acts parametrically. In contrast to the parametric version, strategically rational agents must make judgments about the likely choices of others (including their types and beliefs) because their fates depend on what others will choose and so to make their own choices (to satisfy their self-interests) they must put themselves in the place of others choosing their action (who are simultaneously thinking about them in the same way). Being able to judge the likelihood of how the other will choose means understanding their type and their beliefs. In this sense it must be sensitive to context, culture, and personality type. Now this instrumental conception of the self is one that sits very uncomfortably with social scientists (other than economists). It appears too superficial, narrow, cold, and unnuanced a view of human nature to offer anything to any rounded understanding of cultural and social location and the richness of human life. Such assumptions are reasonable given the hegemony of its sister conceptöparametric rationalityöin the form of Homo economicus öthat pared-down, mean spirited, selfish actor. Homo economicus does seem to have a good deal to say about the type of behaviour that prevails in narrow market conditions. However, the idea of strategic rationality is not confined to market relations. It is not trying to say that all actions are rational. It merely states that agents will act consistently in the pursuit of goals that are consequential to them and that that will involve taking into consideration the plans and purposes of others. In this paper I cannot pursue all the implications of an understanding of strategic rationality for ideas of identity and selfhood, socially constituted relations, culture, and habits (for an initial statement see Bridge, 1997b) . I think the idea of strategic rationality can afford us an entry point to question situatedness and universality, the relation of self and others, and forms of sociality and social ethics.
One way to think about this is to consider Harvey's (1996) dialectical understanding of situatedness and universality. He argues that situatedness is not separateness and unrelated difference but the outcome of dialectical power relations. These power relations constitute``multiple forms of interaction with the world construct individuals as'' (page 355), quoting Young (1990b, page 232) ``a play of difference that cannot be completely comprehended''. Here he is acknowledging the poststructuralist view: an individual does not have a solid identity but is rather``a bundle of heterogeneous and not necessarily coherent impulses and desires'' (page 355). Harvey continuesö``individuals are heterogeneously constructed subjects internalising`otherness' by virtue of their intricate relations to a highly diversified world'' (page 355). Yet for Harvey, these relations are constituted as a dialectical process, and predominantly in terms of proximity to capital accumulation. He is interested in the social constitution of situatedness and the production of difference and positionality as an historical and geographical process.
The abstract, ahistorical ideas of rational choice might seem to be in sharp contrast to this historical/geographical understanding of dialectical processes and the social constitution of difference. Yet I would argue that an understanding of strategic rationality is at the heart of what we might think of as social constitution. It is entry point, or base conditionöthe mechanismöout of which`the social' and difference are constituted. Difference is constituted out of rationality.
Strategic rationality is a function of interaction (taking-in other agents' strategies). Nevertheless the boundaries of the agent are not fixed. It is how consistent purposes congeal that counts and these might be constituted at a range of social and spatial scales. This shares the poststructuralist view that there is not necessarily something solid about identity. Purposes might be attributed to individuals, groups, networks, organisations, nations, and even to machines and networks of humans and machines. The arena of interaction can be seen as a force field of interacting purposes. Hume (1978) argued that rationality serves the passions (what I am calling here purposes, or in traditional rational choice öpreferences). In common with the poststructuralist argument, individuals (or other bundles of purposes) are not necessarily wholly coherent, or in this case rational. In contrast to the poststructuralist view, however, the argument in terms of strategic rationality would be that individuals or other constituted agents are not wholly incoherent either. It is precisely the coherent (or consistent) desires of agents that need to be considered. Consistent purposes are the ones that constitute the force in the force field of social interaction. (2) Consistent purposes are usually the ones that have had most reflexive input. Such purposes are reflexively consequential for the agents themselves (in contrast to impulses, which might be consequential but not reflexively so). These purposes must be consistent over time and space. (3) Ethical norms are the most durable. In the timeŝ pace of interaction, consistent purposes are ones that are rationalisable, not in the Habermasian substantive sense of good reason or grounds, but in the instrumental sense that they display consistency of choice at different time^space junctures.
Social constitution and differentiation emerge from the sharing of rationalisable strategies. This is a higher order rationality that rests not only on common knowledge of rationality but on common knowledge of rationalisable strategies (Bridge, 1997b) . A great deal of human interaction relies on the fact that those with whom one interacts will act in ways that are consistent with their purposes. (4) These are baseline rational expectations for interaction to be possible. The degree to which purposes come to be sharedöthat is, the level of shared rational expectationsöis the mechanism of social constitution and differentiation. High levels of shared common expectations, or common knowledge (or as the phenomenologists call it the stock of knowledge) for example, result in distinct social configurations öthat communitarians want to preserve.
This base condition of strategic rationality is indeed abstract and ahistorical öit is a necessary base-level condition for human interaction to be possible öthe`rational bridgehead' as Hollis called it (see, for example, Hollis and Lukes, 1982; Wilson, 1970 ). Yet the differentiated outcomes of interdependent rationality are the very stuff of historical, spatial, and social difference. Strategic rationality is not the property of individuals or organisations but exists between agents as a result of their interdependent decisionsörationality is a social phenomenon. It is not confined to the narrow motivations of market exchange, but can encompass social difference and dramaturgical performances (Bridge and Huxley, 1997) .
There can only be so much difference, though. The key argument here is that the interaction of different rationalisable strategies means that only certain types of (2) To follow Harvey's concerns, consistent purposes might be attributed to global networks of capitalists, for example. (3) Although the degree to which preferences are durable has been extensively discussed (see, for example, Broome, 1991). (4) Some actions might be random, impulsive, or nonrational, but not usually when it comes to reflexive consequential action. interaction are possible or sustainable. (5) An understanding of strategic rationality helps narrow the field of the possible forms of social coordination and distinction. It also helps to point out other possible forms of coordination ö`we' might want to be some place else. Not all sustainable forms of social coordination are desirable or equitable. But a framework of strategic rationality makes a start at answering Sayer and Storper's normative call for thinking positively``about what forms of social order actually exist and, as far as we can see, could feasibly exist at some other time'' (1997, page 7).
The conception of agents with consequential purposes interacting with each other thus captures the situated concerns of the communitarians and postmodernists. It is easier to have rational expectations about the purposes of others with whom you have regular contact and a shared history. Common knowledge is a form of rational shorthand that avoids repeated calculation over the purposes of others. However the detraditionalising forces of late modernity bring greater contact with unlike others who do not share purposes and assumptions. Here agents must make judgments about others in terms of their types and beliefs as well as their likely choice of rationalisable strategy. (6) This latter argument has parallels with Benhabib's (1992) notion of``interactive universalism''. For Benhabib interactive universalism consists of moral relationships between concrete and particular selves. However, this relationship transcends the situated and particular because of the`enlarged mentality' that is required to take up the perspective of the other and avoid stereotyping (or definitional identity as she calls it). An enlarged mentality is a sensitivity to and appreciation of the wide range of moral considerations that are relevant in particular settings. It involves a reversibility of perspectives implicit in adult relationships.
This enlarged mentality has a good deal in common with Young's (1990b) idea of thè`a cknowledgement of unassimilated otherness''. Young is suggesting a sort of cosmopolitan ethic born out of postmodern urbanity of relations in the unoppressive city. Benhabib's enlarged mentality suggests a form of sophisticated and cosmopolitan consciousness. Cosmopolitan consciousness results from a broad experience of different types of relationships, values, and cultures.
Though reasonable as an aspiration it is clear that such cosmopolitanism has not yet been attained in a world that is often marked by a closing down of perspectives in forms of prejudice, authoritarianism, or fundamentalism. There is a good deal of utopianism in these visions as there is with the Habermasian view that in a dialogue based on illocutionary success, an agent's primary aim would be to achieve an agreement on a definition of the situation. Equally postmodern versions of corporeal ethics based on a`letting be' with an intimate acknowledgement of particularity and difference, seem utopian in view of a corporeal politics that often manifests harm, violence against the body, and a lack of respect for the embodied subject.
What the Habermasian, communitarian, and postmodern ethical programmes fail to offer, given the oppressions of the system that they all acknowledge, is any convincing reason (beyond a utopian aspiration) as to why people should act (or not act) in the way they suggest. I propose here that one way to map the beginnings of an ethical programme is to suggest that it can be built on the assumption that people will act strategically in their own self-interest. Self-interest is utility maximisation and can encompass any human motivation (from altruism to egotism).
Benhabib argues that interactive universalism rests on people's ability to take on the perspective of the other. But why should they? Here I argue that people will take on the (5) In game-theoretic terms they must be Nash equilibria. (6) A game of incomplete information.
perspective of the other if it is in their own self-interest to do so. This is precisely what a strategically rational approach argues. In situations of interaction a person's fate is in part determined by the choices of others. To do our best for ourselves in that situation we must attempt to judge how others will choose. To do that we must put ourselves in their position, with their values and beliefs.
As I have previously argued in this paper the social and spatial coordinates of late modernity (Bridge, 1997a; Harvey, 1989; Jameson, 1991; Massey, 1993) mean that individuals must take account of a greater range of types of other person ötheir passions and purposes, their values and beliefs öthan might have been the case in traditional society based on small-scale community and ascribed social roles. Given developments in transport and communications media the way in which actors encounter each other is less a function of the predictable space of community and tradition, and more to do with the layering of local and nonlocal network relationships that characterise late capitalism. The terrain of time^space means that social networks veer between the intimate at one moment and the nonlocal and abstract at another (timeŝ pace compression and distanciation). Time^space can be thought of as series of relations between networks. The network formations and disruptions, the unpredictable connections and disconnections that are made, the idea of identity as network characterise the terrain of time and space in late modernity. Under these conditions it is ever more necessary to consider a greater range of types, values, and beliefs in what we might call an`enlarged mentality'. Thus the time^space character of late modernity makes this way of thinking strategically more necessary.
A number of postmodern ethical positions advocate a`letting be' to allow for difference as part of general critique of conventional ethics for its action-orientation. In contrast, the strategic rationality assumption implies that the ability to take on the perspective of the other is a result of thinking about action. This approach offers an explicit reason why the perspectives of others might be taken into account in contrast to the more elusive formulations of postmodern ethical arguments.
Whilst strategic rationality centralises the interaction with others, it does not subsume the interests of the individual within the interaction, in a way that Levinas's unconditional responsibility in the face of the other does. Indeed there is an explicit distinction made between sympathy and empathy. Sympathy is the capacity to take on the inclinations and sentiments of others as though they were our own. In rational choice terms this means having altruistic personal preferences (our preferences are ordered by the preferences of othersöthis is still self-interested action, it is altruistically self-interested). Empathy on the other hand is``the process through which we imagine ourselves into the shoes of others to see things from their point of view... but the process stops short of the point where we supposedly cease to separate our interests from those with whom we identify'' (Binmore, 1994, page 56) . Empathy enables us to put ourselves in the other's position but does not have a direct effect on our own personal preferences.
This distinction between sympathetic and empathetic preferences has significant implications for contemporary moral geographies as they relate to liberal^individual-ism, communitarianism, and postmodern ethical theories. Sympathetic preferences, the subsumption of our own interests for those of others, may characterise the unrestrained individual good Samaritan, but it might also capture the subsumption of individual will to community norms. In the communitarian case individual preferences are indistinguishable from the preferences of the community. In contrast, what might be reasonably expected in modern society is that individuals or communities have the capacity to empathise with other value positions in pursuing (maximising) their own preferences. Indeed, if these decisions are made in conditions of engagement and interdependence the best way for them to pursue their ends is to take account of the likely choices of people with other values (types) because this may affect their strategy choice. They can put themselves in the other's position without losing sight of their own interests. I suggest that this version of human nature that is mindful of differences but also self-directed is consonant with the sorts of cosmopolitanism that Young is advocating. It is more attuned to the consequences of modernity and its more variegated terrain of time, space, and social interaction.
Strategic rationality and the cosmopolitan ethic Empathetic preferences can support unethical behaviour. The con artist, the fleecer, the blackmailer all may use an understanding of the other to great effect in their activities. Why should empathetic preferences lead to ethical choices and behaviour?
One explanation advanced by Binmore (1994; 1998) is that ethical norms are an outcome of evolution. The ability to derive fairness norms results originally from hunter^gatherer society in which a hunter might be successful one day and unsuccessful the next. In these circumstances it is strategically rational to cooperate with a fellow hunter so that if you are successful one day you share your kill and if unsuccessful the next you receive a part of the successful hunter's kill. It is an elemental insurance contract. As the history of humankind has progressed, the scope of the insurance contract has expanded, through wider kin, and then group solidarities (a© la communitarians). In modern societies insurance contracts became ever more elaborate and bureaucratic.
The sum of Binmore's argument is that morality is about fairness and it pays to be fair to ensure a social insurance contract. Now this seems to be getting very close to Rawls's original position behind the veil of ignorance. Behind the veil people have to choose between hypothetical societies in ignorance of the type of person they will turn out to be in any one society. Binmore's veil of ignorance is much thinner than Rawls's. It does not remove agents from their current society. Agents know everything about the current cultural and social makeup of their society. They also have empathetic preferences: they are able to put themselves in other people's positions and have their preferences. In terms of the moral^spatial matrix of figure 1 these agents have a good deal of situated knowledge (Bridge, 1997b) . This situatedness even extends to the sort of social contract they might negotiate in the original position. For Binmore this might be contingent: different social contracts might be agreed upon depending on who turns out to be who (given that different individuals might put different values on turning out to be a certain sort of person). This is a version of impartiality that takes into consideration the subjective assessments of individuals (a subjective impartiality) rather than relying on some objective standard of evaluation (such as Rawls's primary goods). This example emphasises the point that a strategically rational approach to these issues can encompass situated knowledge (of our cultural and social context) as well as a capacity for abstract thought (engaging in the act of thinking as though we were the other). Indeed some form of abstraction is necessary to be able to think as though we were the other. This is the root of situated universalism.
The degree of contingency of contract in this context is all about the degree to which individual or corporealised difference, in the postmodern sense, is acknowledged. How much do we base our morality on the situated, phenomenologically present context? If we did so wholly it would be difficult to sustain multiple contingent contracts across all social contacts. It is possible with kin and friends (as it was for most of human history) but unfeasible in the case of the multiple levels of intensity of interaction given the complexity of time^space coordinates of late modernity. In these conditions it is strategically useful to combine a capacity to understand the situatedness of the other but also to abstract away so that we can attain broader social contracts that make any form of community or society possible in late modernity.
Strategic self-interest, whether it be altruism or egotism, explains why we put ourselves in the place of the other and try to think their thoughts by imagining their tastes and beliefs. In this sense a game-theoretic approach to ethics locates knowledge in the situatedness of knowledge users, rather than knowledge producers, and their rational dilemmas over consequential action (in this case ethical choices).
I believe this capacity for a situated universal ethical realm is enhanced by the time^space conditions of late modernity. The sociospatial transformations over the last 300 years have accelerated the mutual encounters with`otherness'. Urbanisation and the transformation of labour, mass international migrations, population growth, technical innovationöall have led to a greater encounter between cultures, lifestyles, and values. In a strategically rational sense this enhanced encounter means thinking in the situatedness of a greater range of othersöan expanded mentality. In contrast to Binmore's evolutionary pace in the explanation of these issues, I would argue that the spatial consequences of late modernity is an expanded mentality resulting from strategic choice. Increasingly the operation of self-interest in conditions of strategic interaction means that an understanding of`difference' is being taken into the agent's cognitive process. The autonomous, atomised, rational agent of liberal individualism would be too cognitively isolated to deal with this interdependence (`he' would be acting as a parametrically rational agent).
The increased encounter with otherness means that situated knowledges (and cultural intersubjectivity) become more significant but also more questionable. There is a sense in which the appeals of communitarianism are yearning for a more enclosed and predictable space and sociality that they imagine predates modernity. Drawing on Wittgenstein's (1953)`forms of life' the strong communitarian agenda rests on the incommensurability of values and ethical realms: it is impossible for us to imagine what it is to be the other. Here of course I would argue that it is possible for Adam the capitalist to imagine what it would be like to be Eve the worker, if it is in his strategic self-interest to do so. This is not to say that norms are not important and they do bind in norm followers most powerfully. Indeed game theorists see norms as Nash equilibria (a strategic interaction in which everyone is content with their strategy choice given what they think others will choose). This can bind people in all sorts of ways, some of which may be inherently unfair to most of the followers of the norm [what Ullman-Margalit (1977) calls partiality norms]. Sugden criticised Gauthier's attempt at establishing a rational basis for normative agreement by pointing out that interdependent rational choice often results in multiple equilibria (ethical norms) between which one cannot rationally choose. However what multiple Nash equilibria also demonstrate is that there are other possible norms. Unlike communitarianism, this analytical approach is not overburdened by the normative content of norms. Cultural and ethical norms are important and situated but they are just one set of social equilibria amongst a much wider range of possible worlds in the coordination of societies, a point that is emphasised by modernity's revolution in time and space and its social consequences.
Conclusion
A strategically rational view of ethics does not make presumptions about what constitutes the good life but rather sees ethical systems as strong forms of social coordination. The community loyalties privileged by communitarians and acknowledgement of difference in the postmodern framework all rely on rational expectations for their senses of distinctiveness to be possible. But these same expectations can only coordinate in limited ways. Rather than an endless play of difference there can only be so many ways to coordinate society in terms of strong (ethical) norms. An increased awareness of the range of norms comes with the broader forms of social interaction that characterise the time^space conditions of late modernity.
Strategic rationality is rationality shared socially (through interdependent decision) and situationally. The limits of rational expectations mark the borderlands of the social constitutions of difference. In conditions of the more mobile encounter with difference, the operation of empathetic rationality, serving self-interested ends, but increasingly cognisant of the other, results in an`expanded mentality'. In the continuous mutual encounter of expanded mentalities there is the capacity to compare ethical norms and from them generate new ways of coordinating behaviour. Instrumental rationality is taking more and more of a deliberative turn. There is considerable scope for an exploration of the instrumentalist assumptions of certain variants of liberalism (expressed here in terms of game theory) and the deliberative, communicative concerns of Habermas and other critical theorists (see Johnston, 1991; . What I am arguing at this juncture is that it is from an instrumentalist, cosmopolitan`expanded' mentality, that more universalist ways of coordinating between situated ethical positions might emerge. It is the rational motivation for a situated universalism.
